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Brain imaging holds great promise for improving our understanding of disorders of consciousness and for guiding
diagnosis and treatment of these disorders. It is also a new
approach and the published literature is still small and not
entirely consistent. Fins and colleagues (2008) have therefore
undertaken the important and timely project of formulating
recommendations for future research. They make a number
of valuable points, but strangely they omit any mention of
the issues that make this research so uniquely challenging
and important—issues related to consciousness.
Neuroimaging of severely brain-damaged patients is
important because, in the authors’ words, it has “provided
clues of otherwise elusive conscious processes in the injured
human brain.” Yet in analyzing the literature and formulating their recommendations, they write that that “the major
challenges are patient selection and study design, and standardization of the technology, including stimulus selection
and experimental protocols.” The aspects of study design
to which they refer concern correlations with established
diagnostic criteria to address issues of nosology and diagnosis and longitudinal designs to address issues of prognosis. What has been overlooked are the issues of conceptual
analysis and study design that make imaging consciousness
different from imaging other brain phenomena such as demyelination, plaques, or blood flow. Analyzing the literature
on brain imaging of consciousness in terms of sample size
and scanning parameters is a little like analyzing a steamy
love scene in a movie in terms of lighting and camera work.
Granted, these are important to get right, but they’re not
what we’re most interested in!
Consciousness is at the heart of the distinction between
the vegetative state (VS) and minimally conscious state
(MCS). It is also essential for determining our ethical obligations to a patient; for example, determining whether custodial care is enough and whether we should supply pain relief
for painful conditions or procedures. Yet unlike most neurological signs and symptoms, the presence of consciousness
in a noncommunicative patient cannot be measured, observed, or ascertained by examination. We are left with a particularly intractable form of the classic philosophical “problem of other minds”; in other words, the problem of inferring
the mental experience of another being from the observable
behavior of that being. Whereas only the philosophical skeptic would doubt that a talking, behaving human has con-

scious experiences, in the case of severely brain-damaged
patients it is often difficult to know. Patients who appear to
be in a VS may instead be in MCS or even “locked-in”; that
is, fully conscious yet unable to communicate (Bauer et al.
1979). How might the imaging of brain activity provide information about patients’ mental processes when their behavior does not? According to virtually all conceptions of
mind–brain relations in contemporary philosophy of mind
(identity theories, varieties of functionalism, supervenience
theories), one cannot be in the brain state corresponding to
a mental state without also being in that mental state. Thus,
brain imaging gives us a perspective on thought processes,
including conscious thought processes, that is direct in a
way that behavior is not (Farah, 2008).
Of course, in order for brain imaging to live up to its potential as a tool for studying consciousness in severely braindamaged patients, some conceptual and empirical groundwork is needed. So here I offer additional recommendations
for future neuroimaging research on disorders of consciousness, to supplement those already offered in the Target Article. These recommendations focus on the ways in which
consciousness is operationalized in imaging studies, the implicit assumptions involved in operationalizing consciousness in these ways, and implications for future research.
Functional brain imaging has been used in three qualitatively different ways to infer the mental status of severely
brain-damaged patients. The logic of the experimental designs, and their consequent strengths and weaknesses, differ
across the three cases. The first recommendation is therefore
to bear these differences in mind and avoid treating them
as equivalent when interpreting the results of studies and
attempting to integrate the results of multiple studies.
Examples of all three approaches can be found in
Table 1 of the Target Article. One approach is to show preserved high-level cognitive processing by patients’ brains, of
the kind normally accompanied by consciousness. This approach is exemplified by the study of Schiff et al. (2005). Patients in MCS were scanned while recordings of either meaningful speech or backwards speech were played to them. The
difference in brain activation in response to forward and
backward speech was used as a measure of their brains’
processing of meaningful speech per se; that is, without
auditory processing that is common to both meaningful and
meaningless speech sounds. Surprisingly, the MCS patients
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showed patterns of brain activity that were qualitatively
similar to those evoked in normal healthy subjects, suggesting that large-scale networks underlying language comprehension were to some degree preserved in these severely
brain-damaged individuals. Although the authors of the
study were careful to interpret these results as indicating
preserved language function but not necessarily consciousness, the results have been described elsewhere as indicative
of consciousness (Carey, 2005) and the finding is discussed
in most reviews of consciousness in VS and MCS. The implicit assumption here is that higher cognitive processes,
such as those involved in speech recognition, cannot be carried out unconsciously, and so evidence of these cognitive
processes is evidence of consciousness. This assumption is
supported by everyday experience, but it is not true under
all circumstances. As pointed out by Levy (2008), the cognitive psychology literature contains many examples of dissociated cognition and awareness. More to the point, brain
damage can lead to just this type of dissociation (Farah et al.
1993). In short, cognition is not the same as consciousness. To
demonstrate consciousness, other approaches are needed.
A second approach to detecting consciousness in
severely brain-damaged patients makes use of previous cognitive neuroscience research on the neural correlates of consciousness. It involves showing preservation of patterns of
activity that have been demonstrated, in previous research,
to distinguish conscious from unconscious processing. This
approach is exemplified by Boly and colleagues (2004) listed
in Table 1 of the target article. In this study, investigators
used simple clicks as probes to activate the brain and looked
to see what parts of the brain became active and whether the
activity in these different parts was intercorrelated. The implicit assumption here is that consciousness arises with certain patterns of brain activity — perhaps activity in certain
regions, such as medial frontal and parietal areas, or activity that is correlated across certain brain areas. Such an association between patterns of activation and consciousness
would have to be demonstrated initially by experimental
manipulations of consciousness in normal brains and then
used as a signature of consciousness in the damaged brain.
Boly et al. sought patterns of activation like those demonstrated in other studies to mark conscious auditory perception and found them in MCS but not VS patients. A weakness of this approach comes from the paucity of brain imaging studies in which conscious and unconscious processing
have been directly compared. To advance research using
this approach, we need more such studies, using different
subject populations and different methods of manipulating
conscious awareness of stimuli, to provide a more general
and reliable “brain signature” of consciousness.
The third and final approach that has so far been taken
is to use brain activity as a surrogate for overt behavior
in examining patients for consciousness. This was used by
Owen and colleagues (2006) to demonstrate command following in a patient who met criteria for VS. The commands
in this case were to imagine playing tennis or taking a walk
through the rooms of one’s home, and the patient’s compliance with these commands was demonstrated by patterns
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of brain activity characteristic of imagined motor activity
and imagined navigation. The implicit assumption for this
approach is that such commands cannot be followed without conscious awareness. If it were the case that hearing
the request to imagine playing tennis could automatically
and unconsciously trigger motor imagery, then Owen et al.’s
findings would not be evidence of consciousness. However,
this seems implausible. After all, when a patient squeezes
the examiner’s hand on request, we take that as evidence
of consciousness and do not ask whether the squeeze could
have been triggered unconsciously. Nevertheless, this approach could be strengthened by devising commands that
result in recognizable patterns of brain activity but are even
less plausibly attributed to automatic and unconscious associations with specific words or phrases.
In sum, three research strategies that have been used
so far to detect consciousness in severely brain-damaged
patients. One is based on an incorrect assumption about
the relation between consciousness and cognition, and these
studies should not be used for evidence concerning patients’
conscious awareness. In contrast, the other two strategies
hold promise. Their potential can be more fully realized by
further research on the neural correlates of consciousness
in the healthy brain and the development of new protocols
using brain activity as a surrogate for behavioral responses.
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